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Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v.
Walsh: The Supreme Court Allows the States To Proceed
with Expanding Access to Drugs
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, J.D.*
INTRODUCTION
On May 19, 2003, the Supreme Court in Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America v. Walsh affirmed a court of appeals decision
allowing for the implementation of the Maine Act to Establish Fairer
Pricing for Prescription Drugs.' The Maine program attempted to leverage
the considerable market power of the Medicaid program to force drug
companies to offer the state a discount on pharmaceuticals. The state in
turn would pass the savings on to its uninsured residents. Manufacturers
that refused to negotiate a discount with the state would face the prospect
of their products being available to Maine Medicaid recipients only with
prior authorization, resulting in a considerable loss of market share for
these manufacturers.2
The Walsh case permits states to use the market power they wield
through their Medicaid programs to make prescription drugs more
affordable to their residents, albeit subject to some constraints. The Court
decisively rejected a broad constitutional challenge to the Maine program
based on the prohibition against state interference with interstate
commerce.! Had this challenge succeeded, it would have put at risk a wide
range of state pharmaceutical programs. The badly splintered Court left
unclear, however, the precise conditions under which states may use their
Medicaid market power to benefit residents not covered by Medicaid. The
Court established only that the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), the trade association that brought
* Robert L. Willett Family Professor, Washington and Lee University School of Law,
Lexington, Va.
1. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 123 S.Ct. 1855 (2003).
2. 123 S.Ct. at 1863-64.
3. 123 S.Ct. at 1870-71.
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the case, had not yet proven that the Maine program violated the Medicaid
statute by imposing a state requirement lacking a "Medicaid purpose. '
The Court also suggested that states might do well to consult the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) before proceeding with
Medicaid-related drug programs.
This Article begins by examining the scope and seriousness of the
pharmaceutical access problem in America. It proceeds to describe briefly
the range of programs that state governments currently employ or are
considering to address this problem. Next, it discusses the opportunities
states have to leverage their Medicaid market power to expand drug access
among non-recipients of Medicaid. It then examines the Court's decision
in Walsh and how it affects these programs. The Article concludes by
considering additional possibilities the Walsh decision opens up for states
to expand access to drugs.
I. THE PROBLEM: MANY AMERICANS CANNOT AFFORD DRUGS
The problem addressed by the Maine program is a familiar one: The
cost of pharmaceuticals has risen dramatically in the recent past.
Expenditures for retail prescription drugs increased 16.4% in 2000 and
another 15.7% in 2001, and are expected to increase at double-digit rates
through the rest of this decade. 6 While drugs still represent a relatively
small fraction of national health care expenditures (a little over 10%), the
burden of drug costs falls disproportionately on a small number of
individuals, most notably those with chronic diseases.7 The median per
capita drug expenditure for elderly persons in 1998 was $895, but for the
highest-spending one percent it was $6,597.8 The high cost of drugs often
results in the inability of individuals to obtain needed medications. A
recent eight-state study of Medicare beneficiaries found that 25% of
uninsured beneficiaries failed to fill at least one prescription during 2001
due to cost, 27% skipped doses to make their medications last longer, and
4. 123 S.Ct. at 1867-70.
5. 123 S.Ct. at 1870.
6. Stephen Heffier et al., Health Spending Projections for 2001-2001: The Latest Outlook, 21
HEALTH AFF. 207, 209 (2002); Katherine Levit et al., Trends in U.S. Health Care Spending,
2001, 22 HEALTH AFF. 154, 156 (2003).
7. John A. Poisal & Lauren Murray, Growing Differences Between Medicare Beneficiaries with
and Without Drug Coverage, 29 HEALTH AFF. 74, 80 (2001).
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20% spent less on other basic needs to afford prescription drugs." Though
the prevalence of insurance coverage for drugs is much greater than it was
two decades ago, it is still lower than coverage for other health care goods
and services. In fact, some seventy million Americans have no insurance for
prescription drugs. °
Most importantly, Medicare does not yet cover most outpatient drugs,
and thus many senior citizens and disabled persons otherwise covered for
health Care costs lack drug coverage." Although Congress recently adopted
a Medicare prescription drug benefit, the program still leaves significant
gaps in drug coverage for Medicare beneficiaries. 2 The legislation imposes
a $250 deductible and-once that is met-a 25% coinsurance obligation.
3
Moreover, a gap in coverage-commonly referred to as the "doughnut
hole"-exists once total spending exceeds $2,250.14 Beyond this threshold,
the beneficiary receives no further coverage until her total out-of-pocket
spending reaches $3,600 (referred to as the "stop-loss" level), after which
the legislation covers 95% of drug costs.1' Under the legislation, low-
income beneficiaries (i.e., those under 150% of the poverty level) will face
lower cost-sharing and will receive coverage in the "doughnut hole," but
only if they pass an asset test. 16 Furthermore, the new benefit will not take
effect until 2006, leaving Medicare beneficiaries responsible for high drug
costs for another two years, though perhaps assisted somewhat by
pharmacy discount cards. 7 Expanding drug coverage to persons other
than Medicare beneficiaries is not even on the congressional policy
agenda.
9. Dana Gelb Safran et al., Prescription Drugs and Seniors: How Well are the States Closing
the Gap?, HEALTH AFr. W253, W265 (Web Exclusive,July 31, 2002), available at
http://www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/SafranWebExcl_073102.htm (last visited
Dec. 2003).
10. CTR. FOR POL'YALTERNATIVES, PLAYING FAIR, STATE ACTION TO LOWER PRESCRIPTION
DRUG PRICES (2000), available at
http://www.stateaction.org/cpa/publications/pub.cfm?ID=1 12 (last visited Dec. 2003).
11. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE AND PRESCRIPTION DRUGS FACT SHEET, available at
http://www.kff.org/medicare/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID
=14186 (last visited Dec. 30, 2003).
12. Pub. L. 108-173, tit. 1 (2003).
13. Pub. L 108-173 §§ 1860D-2(b)(1) & (2).
14. Pub. L. 108-173 § 1860D-2(b) (3).
15. Pub. L. 108-173 § 1860D-2(b) (4).
16. Pub. L. 108-173 § 1860D-14.
17. Pub. L. 108-173 § 1860D-31.
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II. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION:
STATE PROGRAMS TO MAKE DRUGS MORE AFFORDABLE
For the immediate future, therefore, it appears that progress in
expanding public programs to help cover drug costs is most likely to come
at the state level. 8 The states have in fact been actively trying to address this
problem, devising a diverse set of approaches that vary in he populations
they serve, the extent of assistance they offer, and the mechanisms they
employ to reach their access goals.
The most straightforward solution is simply to provide drug coverage
for those most in need, either directly or through subsidized insurance
plans. As of November 2003, thirty-five states had adopted laws to create
pharmaceutical assistance programs, and twenty-nine such plans were
operational.' 9 All of these programs cover senior citizens, many cover
disabled persons, and a few cover the uninsured generally. ° Most impose
income eligibility limits, which vary from 88% (in Florida) to 500% (in
Massachusetts) of the federal poverty level.2' However, the greatest
disadvantage of these programs is that they must be paid for by the states,
virtually all of which are under a constitutional obligation to balance their
budget every year, and most of which are facing very tight budgets during
the current economic downturn. Some states have financed these
programs with tobacco settlement funds. However, funding remains tight,
and it is unlikely that these direct state drug programs will expand in the
immediate future. Most of the programs are still small (only five had more
than 100,000 members in 2003).22 Furthermore, even in states with well-
established programs, many eligible persons do not participate because of
low program awareness, complex and burdensome eligibility requirements
and procedures, and limited benefits.3
Some states have also used their Medicaid programs to make drugs
more available to the poor and uninsured, a strategy that allows them to
18. The Medicare prescription drug legislation also contemplates the continued
existence of state pharmaceutical assistance programs to assist Medicare beneficiaries with
premium or cost-sharing obligations imposed by the new drug benefit legislation. See Pub.
L. 108-173, § 1860D-23.
19. NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE PHARMACEuTIcAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
(2003), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/drugaid.htm (last visited Dec. 2003).
20. Id.
21. Id. In 2003, the federal poverty level was $8,980 for an individual. 68 Fed. Reg. 6456
(2003).
22. Id.
23. Safran et al., supra note 9.
IV:I1 (2004)
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take advantage of federal funds to help pay for the cost of the program.
Although outpatient prescription drugs are an optional service under
federal Medicaid law, all state Medicaid programs do in fact cover
prescription drugs. 4 There are several ways in which states can use
Medicaid to expand drug coverage. First, several states have simply
expanded eligibility for their Medicaid programs, thus giving poor
residents the full benefit of Medicaid coverage, including prescription
drug coverage.2" The federal Medicaid law offers states a broad menu of
opportunities for Medicaid eligibility expansions beyond the minimum
required federal coverage, including covering, for example, seniors and
disabled persons with incomes up to the poverty level, working disabled
persons up to 250% of the poverty level, or pregnant women and infants
up to 185% of the poverty level.2" Expanding Medicaid to cover all of the
populations permitted optional coverage under federal law (or even the
broader populations permitted coverage under federal Medicaid waiver
provisions) can help to address the fact that drug coverage is unaffordable
for many low-income persons. However, this option is very costly to states.
Although the federal government funds approximately one half to four
fifths of Medicaid costs, 27 the remainder must be paid for by the state, and
when the state Medicaid program is expanded, the state must cover this
cost for all mandatory services (including hospital and nursing home
care), notjust for drugs.8
Therefore, several states have applied for and received federal
Medicaid waivers to provide drug benefits to an expanded population,
usually senior citizens and disabled persons with incomes under 200% of
the poverty level.2 9 Drug-only Medicaid coverage is not an alternative
24. THE HENRYJ. KAISER FAM. FOUND., KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED,
MEDICAID AND PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (2002),
http://www.kff.org/content/2002/20020213/1609-02.pdf (last visited Dec. 2003).
25. See FAMILIES USA, EXPANDING MEDICAID: STATE OPTIONS, COULD YOUR STATE DO MORE
TO EXPAND MEDICAID FOR SENIORS AND ADULTS WITH DISABILITIES? (2002),
http://www.familiesusa.org/media/pdf/ExpandingMedicaid.pdf (last visited Dec. 2002).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1306a(a) (10) (A) (ii)(IX), (X),(XIII) (2000).
27. NAT'L HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, AN ADVOCATES GUIDE TO THE MEDICAID PROGRAM 2.4
(2001).
28.42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(1)(10) (B), 1396d(a) (2000).
29. As of May 2003, this included Illinois, Wisconsin, South Carolina, Florida, Indiana,
and Maryland. These Medicaid expansions to cover optional populations offer only drug
benefits. NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATES AND "PHARMACY PLUS" MEDICAID
WAIVER OPTIONS (2003), http://ww.ncsl.org/programs/health/pharmplus.htm (last
visited Dec. 2003).
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explicitly permitted by the Medicaid statute, but HHS has indicated its
willingness to offer such waivers.3 The federal Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, however, held that such programs are permissible
only if they involve a state contribution to the funding of the program,
31
which could make this approach also costly to states.
III. THE WALSHALTERNATIVE:
USE MEDICAID MARKET POWER TO EXPAND ACCESS
Many states, reluctant to expand state-funded programs when their
funds are scarce, have explored strategies that expand drug access by
forcing down the prices charged by drug manufacturers. States justify this
practice in a number of ways. Drug manufacturers garner famously high
profit margins. During 2002, the top ten U.S. drug companies averaged
profits as a percent of revenue of 17%, nearly five and half times the profits
of the median Fortune 500 company. 2 These profits represented more
than half the total net profits of all Fortune 500 companies combined.
Even if one considers return on assets, which might be a more accurate
representation of their true profits, these top ten drug manufacturers
earned 14.1% for 2002 when the Fortune 500 median return on assets was
just 2.3%.3' Because drug manufacturers are granted effective monopolies
on new drugs both through patent protection and through statutory
market exclusivity periods,' they are able to charge prices far above
competitive levels. Once generics are finally introduced, the amounts
consumers pay for drugs fall rapidly, with generics usually costing less than
half as much as multiple-source brand name drugs.36 However, until
30. See CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., PHARMACY PLUS SECTION 1115 WAIVER
RESEARCH AND DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS, TECHNICAL GUIDANCE AND FACT SHEET,
http://cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/115/RXFACTSHEET41202.pdf (last visited Dec. 2002).
31. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson, 251 F.3d. 219 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In
the challenged program, Vermont has attempted to use the drug rebate as the state
matching funds, and thus contributed none of its own money.
32. PUB. CITIZEN CONG. WATCH 2003, 2002 DRUG INDUSTRY PROFITS: HEFTY
PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY MARGINS DWARF OTHER INDUSTRIES 1 (2003),
http://www.citizen.org/documents/PharmaReport.pdf (last visited Dec. 2003).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Market exclusivity periods block FDA marketing approval for some generic
substitutes even after patents expire or for products or uses that are not patentable. David
G. Adams et al., 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION, 180-84 (1997).
36. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS
IV:I1 (2004)
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generics become available, the market does little to discipline prices.
Manufacturers justify their high returns by arguing that they are
necessary to finance research and development. There is some truth in
this: Drug research is very expensive and risky; the drug development
process is protracted and often unsuccessful. Drug company research and
development costs tend to track profits, and countries that have placed
strict limits on drug prices have seen drug research lag.37 Even so, the
argument has been oversold. Drug companies currently spend far less on
the research and development of new products than they do on
administration and on the advertising and marketing of their existing
products-including expensive but highly successful direct-to-consumer
advertising of prescription drugs."s Moreover, more than one third of
medical and health research and development in the United States is
funded by the American taxpayer. Pharmaceutical companies also gain
from generous tax benefits, which heavily subsidize their research efforts.0
Arguably then, it is only fair that the public, including those who cannot
otherwise afford high-priced drugs, realize some of the benefits of its
investment. States can thus reasonably claim that it is fair to compel drug
companies to give up some of their profits to make drugs more available to
those who cannot afford them.
Perhaps more to the point, states that attempt to limit the amount that
the uninsured (or elderly, or poor) have to pay for drug products are
simply trying to get for their constituents the same deal that drug
manufacturers already offer in the private sector to high volume
purchasers. Drug manufacturers face high front-end fixed costs (including
research and development costs), but comparatively low variable costs, and
AFFECTED PRICE AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 27-32 (1998).
37. See Patricia M. Danzon, Making Sense of Drug Prices, 23 REGULATION 56 (2000); F.M.
Scherer, The Link Between Gross Profitability and Pharmaceutical R&D Spending, 20 HEALTH AFF.
216 (2001).
38. See FAMILIES USA, PROFITING FROM PAIN: WHERE PRESCRIPTION DRUG DOLLARS Go
(2002), http://www.familiesusa.org/site/DocServer/PPreport.pdf?doclD=249 (last visited
Dec. 2003).
39. MICHAEL E. GLUCK, THE HENRYJ. KAISER FAM. FOUND., FEDERAL POLICIES AFFECTING
THE COST AND AvALABILITY OF NEW PHARMACEUTICALS 40 (2002),
http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PagelD=
14078 (last visited Dec. 2003). The National Institute of Health (NIH) funded, in part, the
development of fifty-two of the seventy-seven cancer drugs approved by the FDA by 1996,
and the NIH and FDA contributed to the development of forty-five of the fifty top-selling
drugs approved by the FDA between 1992 and 1997. Id. at 20.
40. Id. at 23-25.
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thus are ideally situated to engage in price discrimination. 4 ' They charge
much less to high-volume purchasers in a position to refuse to purchase
their product (e.g., managed care organizations or hospitals) than they do
to low-volume purchasers (e.g., retail pharmacies or individual consumers
paying out-of-pocket).4 ' The drug industry's own advertising has claimed
that private insurance companies pay 30% to 39% less for drugs than do
the uninsured.43 States would do their needy residents a great service if
they could simply procure for them the same deal that the drug companies
already offer to many other private purchasers.
The most obvious strategy for accomplishing this would be for states to
use the approach already taken to drug pricing under the Medicaid
program-mandating price discounts. Under the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1990, drug manufacturers must, in most
instances, provide state Medicaid programs with rebates for drugs sold to
Medicaid beneficiaries.44 The rebate equals the difference between the
drug manufacturer's average wholesale price and the best price it offers to
other buyers (other than the federal government), or at least 15.1%-
essentially providing states the price discrimination benefit enjoyed by
other large purchasers. 5 The federal government collects pricing
information from drug manufacturers and uses it to determine the size of
the rebate states can demand for particular drugs.46
The 1990 OBRA legislation also provided an important benefit for the
drug manufacturers: It prohibited the states from excluding from a state
drug formulary any of the products produced by a manufacturer that
47
agreed to a rebate program. Prior to the adoption of this legislation,
several states had begun to exclude certain high cost drugs from their
formularies. Since Medicaid is responsible for over 17% of drug
expenditures,48 exclusion from a Medicaid formulary posed a real threat to
drug companies.
Though states are generally prohibited from excluding the drugs of
41. In this respect, they are like airlines or hotels.
42. Roy LEVY, FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: A DISCUSSION OF
COMPETITIVE AND ANTITRUST CHALLENGES IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF CHANGE 73-95 (1999).
43. See CTR. FOR POL'YALTERNAT1VES, supra note 10, at 8.
44. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4401, 104 Stat.
1388, 1388-143 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(c) (2000).
46. Id.
47. David Chavkin, Medicaid and Viagra: Restoring Potency to an Old Program?, 11 HEALTH
MATRIX 190, 203 (2001).
48. Katherine Levit et al., supra note 6, at 158 (2003).
IV:l1 (2004)
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cooperating manufacturers from formularies, they are allowed to impose
prior authorization requirements on some drugs subject to certain
conditions."' Medicaid prior authorization programs must respond to an
authorization request by telephone within twenty-four hours, and must also
provide for the dispensing of a seventy-two-hour supply of drugs while
awaiting authorization. 50 Nevertheless, requiring prior authorization for a
drug frequently has the effect of denying patients access to it, often
because they do not learn of the requirement until a pharmacy refuses to
fill a prescription for which the physician did not obtain a prior
authorization. As a result, it has the effect of reducing the drug's sales.
Maine's program, at issue in Walsh, attempted to use this lever-the
threat of requiring prior authorization-to make discounts available to all
residents of the state who lacked insurance coverage for drugs, regardless
of income .2  The statute creating the program directed Maine's
Commissioner of the Department of Health Services to enter into
"voluntary" agreements with drug manufacturers to extend to the general
population rebates on their drugs and to use his or her "best efforts" to
secure rebates equal to those extended to the state under the Medicaid53
program. These rebates were to be passed back to pharmacies that sell
drugs to eligible Maine residents at discounts reflecting the rebates. Drug
manufacturers who refused to extend voluntary rebates were to be
sanctioned by having their identities released to the public and their
products covered under the Medicaid program only on a "prior
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d) (2000).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d) (5) (2000).
51. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Legal Services Organizations Representing Medicaid
Beneficiaries at 4-13, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh., 123 S.Ct. 1855 (2003)
[hereinafter "Amicus Brief"].
52. ME. REV .STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2681 (2) (F), (5) (West 2003). After the Supreme
Court's decision, Maine enacted a more limited program, Maine Rx Plus, covering only
persons whose income is below 350% of the poverty level, or who have drug costs exceeding
5% of household income or medical costs exceeding 15% of household income. See Maine
Governor Signs New State Prescription Drug Discount Program into Law, KAISER DAILY POL'Y
REPORT, June 26, 2003,
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily-reports/rep-index.cfm?hint=3&DRID=18501 (last
visited Dec. 2003). The Maine Rx Plus program was finally
implemented on January 17, 2004. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MAINE PRESCRIPTION DRUG
DISCOUNT PROGRAM To TAKE EFFECT SATURDAY (2004),
hppt://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily-reports/rep-index.cfm?DRID=21708.
53. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681 (3), (4) (West 2003).
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authorization" basis . Although the state argued that the prior
authorization program would be operated so as to assure that Medicaid
recipients had access to needed medications, it also acknowledged that the
program might in some instances block recipients from receiving their
doctors' first choice of drug. In fact, other states that have implemented
prior-authorization programs have seen dramatic reductions in use of
pharmaceutical products placed on prior-authorization status.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S RESPONSE: PHRMA V. WALSH
In the case that culminated in PhRMA v. Walsh, the trade association
that represents most of the brand name drug manufacturers in the United
States challenged the Maine program, arguing that the statute creating the
program violated the United States Constitution in two respects. First,
PhRMA contended that the statute violated the Supremacy Clause, which
recognizes the preeminence of federal over state law, because the statute
imposed a prior authorization requirement on drug coverage under the
state Medicaid program-thus inflicting a significant burden on Medicaid
recipients-for reasons unrelated to the purposes of the federal Medicaid
statute. In this argument, PhRMA was supported by amicus briefs filed by
the United States Solicitor General and by organizations representing
Medicaid recipients, which noted that Medicaid beneficiaries have indeed
suffered in states with prior authorization programs.
PhRMA also argued that the Maine program was unconstitutional
because it violated the so-called dormant Commerce Clause. The dormant
or negative Commerce Clause is a court-created doctrine implied by-
rather than explicitly found in-the Constitution. Article one, section
eight, clause three of the Constitution gives the federal government the
authority to regulate commerce "among the several States." In a series of
cases, the Supreme Court has stated that this federal authority to regulate
interstate commerce implies a prohibition against the states' doing So.
The dormant Commerce clause has generated a number of complex
strands of doctrinal development over the years. Most successful dormant
Commerce Clause cases, however, involve laws through which a state has
54. ME. REV .STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681(7) (West 2003).
55. See Amicus Brief, supra note 51.
56. 123 S.Ct. at 1867.
57. PhaRMA v. Concannon, Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Reversal, 2002 WL 31156279; PhaRMA v. Concannon; Amicus Brief, supra note 51.
58. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995); Healy v.
Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
IV:I1 (2004)
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attempted to favor its own businesses at the expense of other states5 ' or to
regulate transactions that take place inside other states. '" Where a state
simply attempts to regulate transactions within its own borders (including
regulating prices), the Clause has not been held to apply; and where a state
attempts to further its own legitimate, non-protectionist interests through
laws that incidentally impose burdens on interstate commerce, the laws are
usually upheld under a balancing test.'
PhRMA argued that the Maine statute violated the dormant
Commerce Clause because it 1) set prices for drugs sold by manufacturers
and thus regulated transactions between manufacturers and wholesalers,
which in most instances took place outside of Maine, and 2) favored Maine
consumers at the expense of drug manufacturers located in other states. 2
The federal district court accepted both of PhRMA's constitutional
arguments, holding that the Maine drug program was inconsistent with
both the federal Medicaid law and the dormant Commerce Clause. 3 The
First Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reversed the district court
judgment, holding that the program in fact promoted the purposes of the
Medicaid program by making drugs available to low-income people and
thus helping them to stay off of Medicaid.64 It further held that the
program did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause because it
promoted an important state purpose while minimally burdening
commerce and because it only governed transactions wholly within
Maine.
The Supreme Court upheld the court of appeals' decision rejecting
the district court's preliminary injunction.66 However, the Court was deeply
divided in its reasoning, producing no single majority opinion. Justice
Stevens announced the judgment of the Court in an opinion joined in its
61entirety by only two other Justices, Souter and Ginsburg. Justice Breyer
concurred in most of Justice Stevens' opinion, and in the judgment of the
Court. 8 Justices Thomas and Scalia wrote their own opinions, agreeing
59. See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
60. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
61. Id.
62. 123 S.Ct. at 1870.
63. 123 S.Ct. 1865.
64. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. Of Am. V. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 74-79 (1st Cir. 2001).
65. 249 F.3d at 79-84.
66. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh., 123 S.Ct. 1855 (2003).
67. Id. at 1860.
68. Id. at 1871.Justice Breyer wrote separately to opine that the district court should
have been instructed to seek the view of the Secretary of Health and Human Services as to
11
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with the result of the Court, but disagreeing with the reasoning of Justice
Stevens' plurality opinion. 6 Finally, Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, and
Kennedy dissented from part of the Court's judgment.
70
All of the Justices agreed on one thing: The dormant Commerce
Clause does not prohibit Maine's program.71 The Maine statute neither
attempted to regulate prices of out-of-state transactions nor favored Maine
manufacturers to the disadvantage of out-of-state competitors; thus, it did
not fall within earlier decisions finding state legislation to violate the
dormant Commerce Clause.72
On the Medicaid issue, however, the Court was divided. Six Justices
agreed that the lower court should not have entered a preliminary
injunction blocking the Maine program, but they offered four different
opinions supporting this result. Justice Stevens, writing for himself and
Justices Ginsburg and Souter, opined that the district court erred in
holding that the Maine program served no Medicaid purpose. 3 Stevens
agreed with the court of appeals that the program would provide services
to some "medically needy" persons and also that Medicaid expenditures
might be reduced because of early provision of drugs to "borderline"
persons whose conditions might otherwise worsen, making them eventually
a burden on the Medicaid program.14 Stevens further argued that the prior
authorization program itself might encourage the use of more cost-
effective drugs, thus saving Medicaid money. He also noted that the each
state has considerable discretion in administering its Medicaid program,
and that PhRMA would have had to have shown that the Maine program
had a more severe impact on the access of Medicaid recipients to drugs to
overcome Maine's exercise of its discretion in this instance.76 Stevens
concluded that further proceedings would be necessary to resolve these
issues, noting that the results might very well depend on actions that HHS
might take as a result of the Maine scheme 7
Justices Breyer, Scalia, and Thomas each wrote separately, joining in
the result, but not the reasoning, of the Court. Both Scalia and Thomas
the permissibility of Maine's program.
69. Id. at 1873 (ScaliaJ., concurring), 1874 (Thomas,J., concurring).
70. Id. at 1878.
71. Id. at 1870-71.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1867-68.
74. Id
75. Id. at 1868.
76. Id. at 1868-69.
77. Id. at 1869-70.
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have little use for the dormant Commerce Clause, and gave short shift to
that argument.78 Both would also have thrown out the Medicaid case
altogether, with Scalia taking the position that only HHS has the power to
enforce the Medicaid statute through terminating state funding, 79 and
Thomas arguing that there was no conflict between the Maine program
and the Medicaid statute because the statute allows prior authorization
programs without regard to the state's motive for adopting them. Thomas
further pointed out that HHS, not the courts, is responsible for policing
state compliance with Medicaid requirements.80 Ultimately, both Thomas
and Scalia saw the matter as primarily the concern of HHS, and did not
believe that PhRMA's challenge was properly before the Court.
Justice Breyer, in his opinion, suggested that the appropriate course
for the lower court on remand would be to stay the proceedings under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, and to ask HHS for its views on the
permissibility of the Maine plan.8' Thus, Justice Breyer also believed that
HHS should rule on the Maine plan.
Finally, Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, and Kennedy dissented on the
Medicaid issue, arguing that the Maine statute was preempted by the
federal Medicaid law because it imposed a prior authorization requirement
82on Medicaid recipient for purposes unrelated to the Medicaid program.
The dissenters contended that there was no factual basis for the plurality's
conclusion that the program furthered purposes related to the Medicaid
78. Id. at 1873-74 (Scalia,J., concurring), 1879 (Thomas,J., concurring).
79. Id. at 1874.
80. Id. at 1874-78. The fact that none of the other Justices joined Scalia and Thomas in
their argument that courts have no role in overseeing the Medicaid program would seem to
sound a death knell for the arguments raised by the district court in Westside Mothers v.
Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Mich. 2001). The lower court in that case held that the
federal courts have no jurisdiction over the states in Medicaid cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
and that the Eleventh Amendment bars the courts from providing relief against states that
violate Medicaid requirements. The district court was reversed on appeal, Westside Mothers
v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852 (6th Cir. 2002), and its position has been rejected by other
courts. See, e.g., Antrican v. Odom, 290 F.3d 178 (4th Cir. 2002). Seven Justices in the Walsh
case seem to have no problem with the Court permitting direct challenges to state
administration of their Medicaid programs, though several suggest that it might be better if
the Department of Health and Human Services take a first look at challenges to Medicaid
programs, perhaps foreshadowing a future exhaustion requirement. See Timothy S. Jost, The
Tenuous Nature of the Medicaid Entitlement, 22 HEALTH AFF. 145 (2003).
81. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh., 123 S.Ct. at 1872-73.
82. Id. at 1878-82.
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program.
Three conclusions emerge from the multiple opinions when read
together. First, the entire Court agreed that state attempts to leverage the
Medicaid program to force discounts from drug companies do not violate
the dormant Commerce Clause. Second, seven justices-all but Thomas
and Scalia-agreed that a state should only be allowed to use the Medicaid
program to obtain discounts for non-Medicaid recipients if it can show a
"Medicaid purpose" for such a program, which some would explicitly tie to
the statutory requirement that services be provided in a manner consistent
with "the best interests of [Medicaid] recipients. 8 4 Finally, six justices-all
but the dissenters-agreed that the opinion of HHS regarding the
permissibility of a state drug program that uses the state's Medicaid
purchasing power is important; and at least three-Thomas, Scalia, and
Breyer-would regard it as well nigh decisive.
V. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF WALSH FOR STATE DRUG PROGRAMS
The most immediate result of Walsh is that it clears the way for states to
move forward with adopting and implementing programs to expand access
to drugs for the elderly and uninsured using their Medicaid market power.
The drug manufacturers have been largely successful in blocking such
programs through three years of litigation, but-with the ground rules for
such programs now established by the Supreme Court-states can proceed.
Although the majority of the Justices in Walsh agreed that it was
important that HHS review state plans to use the Medicaid program to
secure drug rebates for their residents, this may not be an insurmountable
barrier to the implementation of these plans. In fact, the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), a federal agency within HHS, has
indicated its willingness to approve the use of Medicaid preauthorization
programs to force drug companies to offer rebates for the benefit of non-
Medicaid populations.5 CMS approval of two such programs in Michigan
covering low-income elderly persons and poor pregnant adolescents has
already been upheld in a lower federal court decision that Justice Thomas
described in his opinion as providing a "careful analysis" of the issue.
88
"
83. Id. at 1880-81.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (19) (2000).
85. Letter from Dennis G. Smith, Director for Medicaid and State Operations, Centers
for Medicare & Medicaid Services, to State Medicaid Directors (Sept. 18, 2002), on file with
author and available at http://www.cms.gov/states/letters/smd91802.pdf.
86. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson, 259 F.Supp.2d 39 (D.D.C. 2003). See
Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh., 123 S.Ct. at 1877, n.5 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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CMS based its approval of the Michigan program on its findings that the
program was likely to save the Medicaid program money by keeping
people whose income is marginally above Medicaid limits off of Medicaid,
and that the Michigan prior authorization programs offered adequate
protections for Medicaid recipients who needed a drug subject to prior
authorization for a particular therapeutic reason. 7 HHS objected to the
Maine program in its Supreme Court amicus brief primarily because Maine
did not impose any income limits. 8 As this feature has now been changed, 9
HHS might well approve the plan.
In the end, of course, rebates at the 15% level, such as those available
under Medicaid, may not be sufficient to make drugs available to many
poor Americans. Because of this, the refusal of the Court to apply the
dormant Commerce Clause in Walsh may be even more important in
expanding the ways in which states can bring down drug prices for their
residents. As long as state programs only regulate in-state transactions, and
are not used to discriminate against out-of-state and in favor of in-state
merchants or industries, states have considerable scope to bargain with
pharmaceutical companies for lower drug prices.
A number of states are adopting aggressive strategies to bring down
drug prices, perhaps even below the price levels enjoyed by the Medicaid
program. Some, for example, are engaged in bulk drug purchasing of
drugs at a state or regional level to force down drug prices for state
employees and for Medicaid recipients, and could potentially expand this
strategy to make drugs more affordable for uninsured residents. 0 Several
states are also considering purchasing drugs from Canada, where prices
are regulated, to make drugs more affordable for state employees9 -
87. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 74-75.
88. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal at 21-22,
Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2001) (No. 01-188). As
noted above, subsequent to Thompson, Maine amended its statute to impose limits on
financial eligibility. See Maine Governor Signs State New Prescription Drug Discount Program into
Law, supra note 52.
89. See Maine Governor Signs New State Prescription Drug Discount Program into Law, supra
note 52.
90. See NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, PHARMACEUTICAL BULK PURCHASING: MULTI-
STATE AND INTER-AGENCY PLANS (2003) http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/bulkrx.htm
(last visited Dec. 2003).
91. See THE HENRYJ. KAISER FAM. FOUND., MINNESOTA TO EXPLORE BUYING PRESCRIPTION
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another strategy that could potentially be expanded to cover the
beneficiaries of state programs. Some states are even considering state
maximum drug price controls.92 Certainly, the Walsh dormant Commerce
Clause ruling removes one important drug industry argument in opposing
state drug price regulation programs.
CONCLUSION
In the absence of decisive federal action to make drugs available to
Medicare recipients and the uninsured, a number of states are moving
forward with state programs to expand drug availability. These programs
have faced vigorous challenges from the drug industry. PhRMA v. Walsh.
gives the green light to one important strategy for making drugs more
affordable-using state Medicaid market power to force down prices.
Perhaps even more importantly, however, Walsh's Commerce Clause ruling
opens the door to even more aggressive state actions to control drug costs.
The case, therefore, marks an important milestone in efforts to make the
benefits of modern pharmaceuticals available to all Americans, and not
just to those fortunate enough to be insured.
92. See NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2002 PRESCRIPTION DRUG DISCOUNT, BULK
PURCHASING, AND PRICE-RELATED LEGISLATION (2003),
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/drugdisc02.htm (last visited Dec. 2003).
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